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IN THE 
-
Supreme Court · of Appeals of Virginik 
AT RICHMOND 
MARYE. HITE, in her own right, and as sole devisee of Barbara 
E. Hite, deceased; JOSEPH M. HITE, and 
JOSEPH COMER, Appellants, 
versus 
TOWN OF LURAY, VIRGINIA, a municipal corporation, 
Appellee. 
To the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia: · 
Petitioners, Mary E. Hite, in her own right, and as sole devisee 
of Barbara E. Hite, deceased; Joseph M. Hite, and Jo·seph Comer, 
r,espectfully represent unto the Court that they ·are aggrieved oy 
degree of the Circuit Court of the County of Page, pronounced on 
the 11th day of April, 1939, in the chancery cause of Town of 
Luray, Virginia, a municipal corporation, v. Barbara E. Hite, Mary 
E. Hite, Joseph M. Hite, Anna Broy Martin, Bernice H. Broy, 
Charles E. Broy, Harriet S. Broy, Joseph Comer, Arinie L. Taylor, 
and others, as will more particularly hereinafter appear. 
2* A transcript of the record, including the original exhibits 
filed in the cause, is herewith filed, marked "Mary E. Hite 
arid others, Appellants, v. Town of Luray, Virginia, a municipal 
corporation, Appellee,-Exhibit A,'' as part of this petition and 
record, including original exhibits, diagram-Exhibit A to Exhibit 
Z, inclusive. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The issue in the case is a narrow one. It involves chiefiy, if not 
entirely, the construction of deed from William Edwin Lauck and 
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wife to David Huffman, bearing date February 28, 1866, granting 
!9. :~~!g · H.l;lffman a tract of land containing 134 acres, together with 
certain- mill or water rights on the remaining tract of land of the 
said grantors, and reserving certain rights in lands of the grantee, 
attached to lands granted and retained by the grantor. The rights 
granted, in part, as mill or water rights, are as follows : 
"The said grantee is to enjoy fully the water. right 
for the mill and saw mill upon said hereinbe-described 
as granted to him, but is to use the same in such manner 
as not in anyway to injitre or damage the land or other 
property retained.by the grantor. In order to more perfect 
enjoyment of said water right, said grantee is to have the 
privilege of repairing the race leading through the lands 
of the grantor but is not to change the location of the 
same; said grantee is also to_have the right to cut a race 
from Dry Run to said race on the water flowing into the 
same through the land of the said grantor five feet wide 
and five feet deep but is to construct the embankments 
of the same so as to prevent overflow at anytime, and to 
secure the aperture through which the water is to flow 
from said run into said race so that at no time shall the 
3* water passing through the same exceed two feet in depth 
and five in width. The said grantor reserves to himself 
in this sale the right of the ordinar)' use of the water of 
the Spring which flows into said mill race-Also the right 
to so · much of the water of said spring as will flow 
through a tube two and a half inches in diameter. Said 
grantor further reserves a road of twelve feet in width 
through the lands sold to said grantee to the grantor's 
land lying west of the land herein conveyed to commence 
at the S9uth East Corner of the land purchased by said 
grantor of Jesse Shuff and others in the road leading 
from Spring farm to Pass Run, to run on the line between 
Spring farm and the line of said Shuff tract. . . . The 
grantee is to put up and keep in repair at his own expense 
a fence running on the line of the land hereby conveyed 
from the abutment to a point of rocks on the north side 
of Dry Run, thence to a rock at the mouth of a small 
hollow ... " 
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Omitting the intervening conveyances, the last deed in the chain 
of title of the said real estate, or the part thereof involved in this 
controversy, bears date November 9, 1937, in which Ida L. Brown 
(widow of W. L. Brown), conveys to the Town of Luray, by metes 
and bounds, a portion of said real estate, containing 6 ~ acres, 
which was a part of a 12 acre tract-part of the lands conveyed to· 
said Huffman, which tract was itself embranced entirely withit~ 
bounds of inclusive survey in deed from Lauck to Judd, and cotj.:. 
taining the above described water and mill rights ( p. 17). · · 
4* *The said deed from Ida L. Brown to the Town of Luray 
( p. 37) purports to convey the said 6 ~ acres, including· "any 
and all water rights in and to what is locally and familiarly known 
as Spring Farm, now owned by Martin Hite's heirs, and.which for 
many years past has been used by the owners of the afor~said 
Brown's Mill property. The water rights above referred to are 
fully described and set out, ·together with any and all reservations 
and restrictions as to use thereof, in that certain deed executed1·oy 
Lauck to Huffman, bearing date on the 28th day of February, 1866." 
The rights granted and reserved are well· defined in· ·said· ·deed 
from Lauck to Huffman, and are reiterated in deed to Judd of the 
Mill Tract. 
The said William Edwin Lauck, grantor in the said deed of Feb-
ruary 28, 1866, conveyed to David J. Patterson, by deed dated 
October 29, 1867,. by metes and bounds, a tract of 274·acres of land 
adjacent to the "Mill Tract," including in its boundaries the Mill 
tract of 12~ acres, but subject to prior conveyances of the said· 
Mill tract. 
5 * *The real estate . retained by the said Lauck, and subse-
quently conveyed to said Patterson, passed by chain of title 
to Martin Hite, by deed dated November 10, 1869, containing 275 
acres ( page 48). 
Martin Hite conveyed from the said 275 acre Spring Farm, cer-
tain small parcels thereof, described in the deeds. 
By decree in a chancery suit for partition of the Martin Hite real 
estate, entered on the 25th day of April, 1914, (page 59), partition 
was made of the real estate of which Martin Hite died seized and 
possessed, among. the heirs entitled thereto. 
· In this partition, it was found that the unsold real estate of Martin 
Hite, contained 218% acres, exclusive of the N. & W. Right-of-
way. There was laid off to Joseph M. Hite yg by metes and bounds 
(pages 60, 67). Lots 1 and 3 were assigned to Belle H. Broy; and 
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to C. B .. Hite, Barbara E. Hite and Mary E. Hite, all the residue. 
of the ,lands,. including the. land containing the buildings. 
· · By ·decree of° August 18, 1914, the partition was p·erfected, with 
numerous reservations one to the other' and the fixing of definite 
·. rights among .the parties entitled to the said real estate. 
6*· · .*C. B. Hite, by his will, devised his real estate to his 
· : ! sisters, Barbara E. Hite and Mary Elizabeth Hite ( page 71 ) . 
Belle Broy (page 7.2) conveyed her assignment to J.·w. Comer and 
W. C .. Comer, by deed bearing date November 1.1, 1919. 
-· W. C. _Comer and wife, by deed dated August 5, 1926, conveyed 
, his interest tP Joseph W. Comer ( page 75) . 
·· · Barbara E. Hite having died after devise of her real estate 
to Mary E. Hite, the cause was revived against Mary E. Hite 
(.page 93). , 
· The persons, therefore, interested in the real estate of which 
Martin Hite died seized are now, Mary E. Hite, Joseph M. Hite, 
and Joseph Comer, all of whose lands are affected by the decree of. 
April.11; 1939, together with the owners of land conveyed by 
Martin . Hite described in said deeds of Martin L .. Hite. 
The 6~ acre tract of land o·f the town of Luray is completely 
surrounded by the lands of appella.nts with the exception of about 6 
acre& whkh was retained by Ida L. Browi1, and originally part of 
the 12 ~ acre tract known as the Mill tract. The water from the 
. 4;000,000 gallon daily flow of the medicinal spring flows through 
.the·camil or race from the springs, entirely over the lands of 
7* appellants to the mill site on the 6 0 acre *tract, and after 
serving its mill purposes, passes over the . other lands of 
appeilants as shown by the map and diagram, until the waters reach 
lands of owners other than Ida L. Brown and appellee. The plat 
and survey (page 100) filed by complainant and allegations of the 
bill show that the 6 0 acre Mill tract is entirely surrounded, except 
to the extent of about 6 acres, retained by Ida L. Brown, by the 
lands of appellants and that after passing through the lands of 
appellee, the waters pass over the lands of appellants to the land 
owners remote to the 6 0 acre Mill tract. 
Answer was duly filed by petitioners in the said cause (page 79), 
with no replication thereto, and case was heard upon bill and answer. 
The learned Judge of the Circuit Court of Page County~ by an 
interesting and able opinion, in a somewhat complicated and involved 
case~ is confidently believed by appellants, not to be warranted by a 
proper construction of the said deed of February 28; 1866, from 
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Lauck and wife to Huffman, and that·a non sequitur conclusion was 
reached in his opinion as follows (p. 91): · 
" ... and the· Town of Luray now owns a right of 
property to all the water in the spr'ing except so much 
thereof as may be necessary for the enjoyment by Lauck 
and his assigns for the reservations made by Lauck in his 
deed to Huffman, to-wit: ... and (2) the right to use of 
so much of the water flowing from the··spring as may 
be necessary to meet the ordinary· (domestic) needs of 
the owners of the lands through which it passes. Both 
the rights and privileges granted and those reserved are 
considered by me as appurtenant to and running as cove-
nants with the lands granted and retained, respectively." 
8* *And the court further by decree of April 11, 1939, (page 
99) appellant avers, improperly decreed: 
" ... and the Court doth accordingly further adjudge, 
order and dec"ree, (first), that the town- of Luray now 
owns a right of proper.ty to a.ll the water in the spring 
or springs except so much thereof as may be necessary 
for the enjoyment by the assigns of W. E. Lauck of the 
reservations made by Lauck in his deed to Huffman or 
Judd; (second), that the said water rights created in the 
deed from Lauck to Huffman or Judd are not ·mere e_ase-
ments but are a vested qualified right of property; (third), 
that the rights reserved by Lauck as aforesaid are ... " 
not easements but are vested qualified right of property. 
" . . .. that ( third-b) the right to use so much of the 
water in the stream flowing from the spring as may be 
necessary · to meet the ordinary domestic needs of the 
owners of the lands through which it passes ; . . . (sixth), 
that the reserved use for ordinary purposes described in 
3b is a restricted riparian right and is a right appurtenant 
to the said 27 4 acre tract, or so much thereof as may be 
riparian ; (seventh), that the reservation for the ordinary . 
use as above described is a restricted riparian right and 
excludes the full riparian user for the extraordinary or 
artificial purposes of developing power from the i'.Jow; 
8 
'! .. 
9* 
10* 
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·or su·ch other temporary diversions of water from the 
stream, even though the said water may be later returned 
to said stream; . . . (tenth) ; that Mary E. Hite as the 
present owner of Lot No. 3 in the Hite division owns all 
the rest and residue of the right to use the water that 
will flow through a two and one-half inch tube and the 
reserved right to use the water in the stream flowing from 
said spring for ordinary domestic use as a restricted 
riparian right appurtenant to her lands that abut said 
stream flowing from the spring or springs aforesaid." 
* And the Court accorded to 'T'own of Luray the rights 
granted in deed of Lauck to Huffman. 
*FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The Court was in error in his construction placed upon 
the deed of 1866, from Lauck to Huffman, and upon the 
deed from Lauck to Judd, of June 4, 1869, particularly, 
fo the judgment by decree of April 11, 1939, that the 
grantee took a vested property right to the springs, and 
the water in the springs, in contra-distinction to an ease-
ment only in the waters flowing in the race or channel 
through the lands of appellants, to and through appellants' 
6 ~ acre tract, the deeds being decreed by the court to be 
practically, and to all intents and purposes, a grant of the 
springs, subject only to the restrictions contained in said 
deeds; and in decreeing that the restriction to the "ordi-
nary'' use of the water flowing in the artificial canals was 
for "domestic use" only, as synonymous to ordinary use; 
and that appellants are precluded from the use of the 
waters for the development of electricity or power, 
whether by use of the mill race before the water passed to 
the mill, or after if flowed beyond the mill, through the 
lands of appellants. 
As hereinabove shown, and particularly by reference to map filed 
by appellee (p. 10~), and by the allegations of appellee's bill of 
complaint, the 6 ~ acre "Mill Tract" at the time of the conveyance 
to t~e Town of Luray, and its predecessors in title, was and is 
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entirely surrounded by the lands of appellants, with the exception 
of an unimportant part thereof, six acres, retained by Ida L. 
Brown. 
11 * * Appellant, or appellants, own a fee simple title to the 
2.28 acres sought to be condemned, and the land surround-
ing the same; all of the lands from the spring to a point in· close 
proximity to the mill itself on the 6 ~ acre "Mill Tract" of the 
Town, and all of the land a lo0g distance below the 6 ~ acre tract, 
as shown by plat and survey, to the adjoining lands of others. 
Appellants show, from the record, that the mill water passing to 
the mill through the race to the mill itself, over the lands of appel-
lants, and from the ,mill tract of 6 ~ acres of appellee, over the lands 
of appellants, beyond to the lands of adjoining landowners, has 
passed without interruption or right of appellee, or its predecessors, 
to interrupt its use as the waters flow through the lands of ap-
pellants. 
The claim of appellee has been stated by it "in reverse," in claim-
ing itself to be the owner of the waters, instead of possessing an 
easement only. On the contrary, the Lauck deeds, incorporated by 
reference in the Ida L. Brown deed to appellee, show that for all 
purposes, the springs, the lands, the canals or channels, are the prop-
erty of appellant, or appellants, and that the "ordinary" use (not 
merely domestic use) of all of the water belongs to the owners of 
the 274 acre tract, now accessible, or may become accessible, to 
every foot of that land, with subordinate rights only in the grantee 
to the use of the water, and then subject to definite restrictions and 
conditions named in the deeds, and then only for the purposes 
named in the said deeds. 
12* *Contrarily, the learned lower court, yielding to the con-
tention of the· appellee, considered that the title to the water 
passed as if a chattel at its source at and in the spring, so that by 
ingenuity of counsel, the land of 2.28 acres containing the springs, 
· could be legally acquired for appellee's use, as land covered by 
water, and separate therefrom, and without payment for diversion 
of the water at its source. Obviously, if the reasoning be sourid, the 
land beneath the spring, being covered by water, possessions, it will 
be claimed by ~ppellee, no market value separate from the water, 
so that appellee may hope by the subtlety of its reasoning, to acquire 
all of the valuable water supply for practically nothing, and, of 
course, seal or shield from view appellants' springs of magnificent 
appearance and refreshing beauty, and establish on the area to be 
condemned its power plant, all without compensation except for the 
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land actually taken-a position, it is believed, that should not com-
mend itself to the conscience of the court or to the better feelings of 
the public acquiring these very valuable rights. · 
13* * Appellants contend that under the Lack deeds, the ex-
clusive right to the water was not granted. The recital in the 
deed that the grantee should "enjoy fully the water right for the 
mill and saw mill" (both impliedly existing at the date of the said 
deed, whatever those rights may have been, and not shown in the 
evidence), does not operate as an exclusive right, and the intention 
that 1t should not be exclusive is emphasized where it is said io said 
deed from Lauck to Huffman: 
"The said grantor reserves to himself "in this sale the 
right of the ordinary use of the wa.ter of the Spring 1.vhich 
flows into the mill race." 
There being nothing in the language of the deed granting an 
exclusive right, and nothing in the reservations that the grantors 
for the benefit of the 274 acre tract, were not to have the right to 
make all ordina.ry uses of the water, there exists no reason why the 
grantors under the provisions of the said Lauck deeds, incorporated 
by reference in the deed to Brown, and reaffirmed in the said Brown 
to the Town of Luray, could not make any ordinary and reasonable 
uses of the water for any purposes, that would not unreasonably 
deplete or divert the supply of water as it passes to or beyond 
the mill. 
14* * Appellants insist that the court was in error in further 
decreeing ( p. 1 OD-7th) : 
" ... that the reservation for the ordinary use as above 
described is a restricted riparian right and excludes the 
full riparian user for the extraordinary or artificial p~r-
poses of developing power from the flow; or such other • 
temporary diversions of water from the stream, even 
though the said water may be later returned to said 
stream." 
The language of the deed does not prohibit the ordinary use of 
the water for any' reasonable purpose, and the reservations do not 
pr~vent it, but expressly and sensibly reserve those rights to the 
owner of the 27 4 acre tract. 
There is nothing in the deed that restricts the grantor to the use 
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of the water flowing into the race. to "domestic" uses, as the 
appellee would have the court believe. "Ordinary,'' as applied to 
the present situation, is defined by Webster's New Intematio.nal 
Dictionary, as "common; customary; usual." · 
The deed of Ida L. Brown to the Town of Luray reaffirms the 
Lauck deeds, and the bill of complaint of the Town shows the 
Town to be bound by its terms, so that the rights granted to the 
Town are subject to all or_dinary uses that may be now made, a~d 
that the growing needs of business and society may yet' reasonably 
demand. 
15* *Appellee's bill sets forth it~ water needs for the Town 
of Luray and asks the court to determine_ just what its rights 
are under the Brown deed, for the purposes of condemnation, and 
for a d~claratory judgment to be used in the condemnation pro· 
ceeding. 
If the court's construction of the title papers be correct, appellee 
will, following the decree of the court, naturally assert, upon basis 
of the judgment of the court, that the Town has acquired the right 
to all of the water at its source in the springs, subject to the reserva-
tions as construed by the court ; that 
"The reserved riparian rights of user in the. water of 
the stream flowing from said spring are only 'the right to 
the ordinary use of the water of the spring which flqws 
into the said Mill race,' but do not embrace any right for 
extraordinary or artificial purpose of developing power 
from the flow of such related use that might exist if 
Lauck had not granted a part of his riparian rights ; that 
practically all the water of the spring must of necessity 
be used and was necessary in an efficient operation of the 
mills; that the grantees of the mill tract by virtue of the 
provisions of the Huffman deed, took as a right appurte-
nant to said mill tract a property right ( as distinguished 
from a mere easement only), in and to the spring and all 
the water flowing therefrom, subject only to ... (b) the 
right of ordinary use of the water for domestic purposes 
only as it flows through the lands" or appellants. 
16* *The couct thus ~ot only appropriates the waters of the 
springs as a channel, but undertakes to limit and restrict the 
right of appellants by means of an improper definition of "ordinary . 
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use," and to assume, and so declare, without evidence to support 
it, that the right to the ordinary use does not embrace any right to 
the use of water for power purposes, not even to light appellants' 
homes, or turn a water wheel for home or other uses; in a word' 
the decree restricts the right to the use of the water to strict 4omestic ~ 
purposes, and only as it flows through the lands of one appellant, 
and restricts the rights to use of the water for domestic purposes 
(p. 99-b) to appellant, Mary E. Hite, in the following words: 
"and (b) the right of ordinary use of the water for 
domestic purposes .only as it flows through the lands which 
the plat .shows belongs to C. B., Barbara E. and Mary E. 
Hite, now owned entirely by Mary E. Hite," 
thus eliminating other potential owners of said water rights. 
17* *THE RIGHT GRANTED OF ·wATER FLOW-
AGE FROM THE SPRINGS TO THE MILLS 
DOES NOT OPERATE AS A SALE OF A 
CHATTEL, BUT ONLY AS AN EASEMENT, 
AND IT WAS SO INTENDED AT THE TIME 
OF CONVEYANCES. 
It will be seen from the deeds that the use only of the water was 
intended. The provision of the easement attached to the remaining 
lands of the grantor, and the words intended to create the rights, 
are not apt words of a technical grant. The provision is : 
"The said grantee is to enjoy fully the wa.ter right for 
the mill and saw mill ... but is to use the same in such 
manner as not to injure or damage the land or other 
property retained by the grantor." 
As further showing that the words consisted of an easement or 
privilege only, the deed recites: 
"In order to more perfect enjoyment of said water 
right, said grantee is to have the privilege of repairi!lg 
the race leading through the lands of the grantor, but 
without changing location of same. Said grantee is also 
to have the right to cut a race from Dry Run to said 
race on the water flowing into the same through the lands 
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of the grantor, 5 ft. wide and 5 ft. deep, but is to con-
struct the embankments of the same as to prevent over-
flow at any time, and to secure the aperture through 
which the water is to flow from said run into said race so 
at no time shall the water passing through the same ex-
ceed 2 feet in depth and 5 in width." 
18* *The foregoing language fails to show a conveyance by 
apt words, of the water at the source of supply, but that 
language is apt to show that the grantee under certain conditions is 
entitled to the use of the water only as an easement or privileged 
and for mill purposes, definitely limited by enforceable provisions 
in favor of the grantor, for the benefit of the lands retained by hini. 
The entire language shows duties and obligations interwoven, 
and all intended to be limited to operation of the mill. If the water 
was to appropriated and diverted at the springs, a very different 
situation would have existed, making usele~s the protecting agree-
ments and restrictions. 
The scrivener of the deed apparently was a trained lawyer, and 
if an absolute grant of the water for all purposes, at its source, 
had been intended, it should not be presumed that the deed would 
not have so declared. Gathered from the reading of the deed as a 
whole, the intention, it is submitted, was not to pass title to the 
water itself, but only to permit the use of the water under definite 
restrictions and limitations, and for the use only of the mill as a 
I 
going concern., The language of the deed, taken as a whole, it is 
submitted, is inconsistent with any other conclusion. 
19* * And the restrictions to the grantor are not inconsistent 
with, but sustain the contention of appellants. The limita-
tions protecting the grantor, in addition to the foregoing agree-
ments, are: 
( 1 ) "The said grantor reserves to himself in this sale 
( of land, of course), the right of ordimwy use of the 
water of the spring which flows into said mill race." 
( 2) "Also the right to so much of the water of said 
spring as will flow through a tube 2~ inches in diameter.'' 
The limitations last quoted are entirely consistent with the con-
tention of appellants, and all the other language of the deed is 
consistent with appeliants' contention that the title to the water did 
not pass as a chattel, and that it was never intended that the water 
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or appellants' springs should be employed for any commercial 
purpose, other than for the use of merchant will or saw mill enter-
prise-at the time very important to the community. 
20* * And the contention of appellants, it is shown, is sup-
ported by reason and authority. 
In R. C. L., Vol. 27, p. 1249, after indicating that the matter-of 
restriction upon the use of water is dependent upon intention, says: 
"It is not a grant of property in the corpus of the water 
as a chattel," . 
citing Easte'r11 PennsJ,lvmiia Power Co. v. Leigh Coal &c., 246 Pa. 
St. 72, 92 Atl. 47. 
And it is further stated, id. 1249 : 
"And the grant of a right to the waters of a spring for 
the use of a .mill, has been declared not to include the use 
of it for domestic purposes at the private residence of the 
miller who is the grantee; a grant of water power is not 
a grant to water for anything else." · 
See also City of Lynchbitrg v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 195 S. E. 510, 
512 (Va.); Dunlap v. Carolina Po1.oer & Light Co. (N. C.), 195 · 
S~ E. 43; Town of Gordonville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S. E. 508, 
14 A. L. R. 318. . 
21.* *The net results of the court's decision are that upon con-
demnation of the 2.28 acres of land, separate from the water, 
and subject to reservations as construed by the court, the Town, 
for the b'are price of the land itself, would appropriate and divert· 
for its own purposes or for sale, the 4,000,000 gallon ( daily flow) 
spring; that at its source it could establish its pumping equipment 
and other water works; seal the springs for protection purposes ( if 
so desired) ; and· allow appellants no use of the natural flow of the 
water through the farm, except the drippings that may be left to 
ooze down the long channel or canal, to form a chain of contam-
inated "mud puddles." 
By the decree, the one appellant only ( Mary E. Hite), would be 
entitled to use or ·fight for "what remains' 'of the water, after 
appellee has "used all it wishes," and the owners of the rest of the 
274 acres are shut out entirely, though they, as potential owners of 
the right to use of the waters, may at any moment become act11al 
. . 
owners. 
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22-* *SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court was in error in determining and decreeing that under 
the deed from Lauck to Huffman, any right existed in Ida L. Brown 
to make a valid conveyance of the water to the Town of Luray, and 
thus divert the ~ater from the plain purpose contemplated by the 
Huffman deed, namely, the water was to be used for the purpose 
of operating a merchant mill and a saw mill. The rights to the water 
in the chain of deeds was limited to the use of the water for the · 
operation of a merchant mill and saw mill. 
Under the statutes of Virginia relating to the right to establish 
mills, the rights of the mill owner were definitely fixed. 
Prior to ai:id for years subsequent to 1867, the court will take 
judicial notice that the merchant and saw mill business was one of 
great importance in Virginia, and especially in the Valley of Vir-
ginia, where the grist mill was an absolute necessity. It is a matter 
of :common knowledge that streams possessing a satisfactory water-
fall, were dotted with mills-both grist mills and saws mills. 
23* *The record does not show just when the Lauck mill was 
first built, but in the deed of February 28, 1866 ( p. 11), the 
description of the land refers to the mill as an existing mill, where 
the deed describes a boundary as "106 poles to the ~iddle of the mill 
road on the south side of the mill race." 
Again, the deed declares the said grantee is "to enjoy fully the 
water right for the mill and saw mill," recognizing the existence, as 
a matter of courset of the said mill. . 
Reference is made·to Chapter 63, page 608, Code 1873, on the 
subject of Mills, embracing, it is believed, the law at the time of 
the c9nveyance in 1866. 
Section 1 of the act, page 608, recognized the authority in the 
mill owner to acquire and use the waters of water courses, where 
it provides that -
I 
"A person having, upon lands owned by him on a water 
course, or proposing to build on such lands, a water mill, 
or other machine, manufactory or engine, useful to t~e 
public, and desiring to erect a dam across, or in such water 
course ( whether he own the lands on either side of the 
water course at the point where such dam is to be erected 
or· not), or to cut or enlarge a canal through lands above 
or below, or to raise a dam which may have been erected 
under an order of court, may apply to the court of the 
' 
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County wherein such mill, machine, manufactory or en-
gine stands, or is proposed to be built, for a writ of ad 
quod damnum." 
24* *By section 9, page 610, it is provided-
" ... or, if such mill, manufactory, machine or engine, 
be at any time destroyed or rendered unfit for use, and 
• the rebuilding or repair thereof shall not, 'lc.,ithin two 
years from the time of sucli destruction or unfitness, be 
commenced, and within five years from that time be so 
far finished as then to be in good condition for use, the 
title to the land so circumscribed, shall revert to the 
form.er owner, his heirs or assigns, and the leave so 
granted shall then be in force no longer" 
except for certain provisions referred to in said section but not 
applicable to this case. . 
See Code 1849, page 328, chapter 73, section 1. 
The foregoing provisions of the act were carried into the Code 
of .1887, sections 1347 and 1356, and Code of 1919, sections 3582 
and 3591; Code 1873, Chap. 9, page 610. 
The legislation upon the subject shows that the rights of the mill 
owner are very greatly circumscribed, and that he has no property 
intere~t in the water of the stream, nor in the banks or canals car-
rying the saipe, after the destruction of the mill and its abandonment 
as a mill. 
25* * Appellants' contention, therefore, is that under the act 
the mill owner was entitled to a qualified use only of the 
.water, and when that right ceased, he was without the power to 
convert his easement into a right of property entitling him to con-
tinue the use of the water for purposes not contemplated by the act. 
Nor is the situation of the grantee improved by any language in 
the deed construing the basis of his title. Every word in the Lauck 
deed is consistent with appellants' contention that the use of the 
water for mill purposes was in contemplation. 
The deed provides for the construction arid maintenance in acer-
t.ain way of the mill race, with the provision that its location could 
:not even by changed; a definite provision for the flow of water 
from Dry Run to the mill is contained in the deed, with exacting 
·requirements as to how that race should be built and how the flow 
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of water should be controlled for the use of the mill. The upkeep 
of the race must be done by the grantee, and the grantors reserved 
the right to the use. of every drop of that water as it passed through 
the grantor's premises for the reasonable use of the said tract of 
274 acres. The livestock of the grantor and his alienees were entitled 
to access to the waters of the race at every point, and were entitled 
not mrely to drink the water necessary to sustain life, but 
26* *were entitled to graze the banks kept moist by the stream, 
and to stand and cool themselves in the waters of the race. 
It is submitted, that the appellee, after the operation of the miIJ 
had ceased, and the property gone into disuse and abandoned as a 
mill, possessed no right under the terms of the Lauck deed, or under 
the statutes, to dispose absolutely of the water for purposes not in 
contemplation at the time of the execution of the deed, but entirely 
foreign to its purposes. The court was in error, therefore, in de-
creeing that the owners of the 27 4 acres of land possessed no interest 
in the water except the restricted uses set forth in the deed, and 
that the Town did not acquire the water so as to be able to appro-
priate and sell it. 
27* *THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
THE DECREE OF THE COURT OF APRIL 11, 1939, 
OPERATES AS THE TAKING AND DAMAGING OF THE 
PROPERTY OF APPELLANTS FOR A PUBLIC AND/OR 
PRIVATE USE WITHOUT COMPENSATION, AND WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The facts upon which this assignment of error is based are found 
in the Statement of Facts, and in Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 
2, and for the sake of brevity, will not be further stated herein. 
The Statement of Facts, and facts stated in Assignments of 
Error Nos. 1 and 2, are asked to be treated as incorporated herein 
by reference. 
28* *FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The Court was in error in failing to declare correctly 
the interests of appellants in the properties involved in 
this controversy, and particularly in failing to declare 
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appellants to be vested with a fee simple or absolute title 
to the lands covered by, and including the water, in place ; 
and in failing to declare appellee to possess no legal inter-
est or rights in the lands of appellant traversed by the 
waters from the springs; or, if this be improper, that in 
the alternative, in failing to declare appellee to be entitled 
to an easement only under the deeds of Lauck to Huffman 
and Lauck to Judd. 
This assignment of error is a natural sequence to assignments 
Nos. 1 and 2; and for sake of brevity, reference is made to them 
for the facts and reasons for this assignment, except that it is 
proper to add that the lands of appellants,. Joseph M. Hite. and 
Joseph Comer, are improperly deprived of the rights "running" 
with them merely because they are not immediately adjacent to the 
springs or water channels. Appellant Joseph M. Hite has access by 
way of the road, to water, as shown on the m~p, and appellants 
Joseph Comer and Joseph M. Hite are potential owners of the rights 
as appurtenant to their lands, and entitled to the enjoyment of those 
rights when other suitable conditions permit. 
29* *CONCLUSION. 
Appellants submit that the learned lower .court, in the decree of 
April 11, 1939, committed errors prejudicial to appellants, as set 
forth in appellants' several assignments of error. 
Petitioners, therefore, pray that an appeal may be allowed, and 
that the court may review and reverse the· said decree,· and enter 
such decree as should have been grantd by the. lower court. 
Counsel for petitioners desire to state orally the reasons for re-
viewing the decision complained of. 
The undersigned, F. S. Tavenner, of counsel, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appepals, certifies that in his opinion it is proper 
that the dedsion should be reviewed by the, said court. Petitioners 
aver that on the7th day of August, 1939, a copy of the foregoing 
petition was mailed to opposing counsel, Messrs. Ford & Keyser, 
Luray, Virginia, attorneys for appellee·. 
Respectfully submitted, 
August 7, 1939. 
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Lucak & Hackley, Attys., 
Luray, Va. 
Harry R. Taylor, Atty., 
Keyser, W. Va. 
F. S. Tavenner, Atty., 
Woodstock, Va. 
Received August 7, 1939. 
MARYE. HITE 
JOSEPH M. HITE 
JOSEPH COMER 
By 
LUCAS A HACKLEY 
HARRY R. TAYLOR 
F. S. TAVENNER 
Attorneys. 
By 
F. S. TA VENNER. 
~ M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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RECORD 
TOWN OF LURAY, VIRGINIA 
A MUl\!ICIPA~ ~ORPORATION, 
versus 
BARBARA E. HITE, ET ALS. 
Pleas at the Court House of the County of Page (before the ' 
Circuit Court of said County on the 11th day of April 1939.· 
page 2 ~ At another day to-wit: December 1st, 1938, came,the 
. Plaintiff, by its attorneys, and filed its bill of complaint 
against the Defendants, which bill is in the words and figures fol-
lows, to-wit : 
page 3 ~ IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA. 
TOWN OF LURAY, 
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
20 Supreme Court· of Appeals of Virginia. 
versus ( Bill in Chancery) 
BARBARA E. HITE, MARY E. HITE, JOSEPH M. HITE, 
ANNA BROY MARTIN, BERNICE H. BROY, CHARLES 
E. BROY, HARRIET S. BROY, JOSEPH COMER, 
ANNIE L. TAYLOR, UNKNOWN HEIRS OF 
NOAH F. HITE, IF ANY, AND THE 
UNKNOWN HEIRS OF GEORGE 
W. HITE, IF ANY. 
Your Complainant, the Town of Luray, Virginia, a municipal 
corporation under the Statutes of Virginia, respectfully represents 
as follows: 
( 1) That your complainant, the Town of Luray, Page County, 
Virginia, is a municipal corporation created and organized under 
the laws of the State of Virginia, and is by the laws of Virginia 
authorized to establish, maintain, operate, extend and enlarge water 
works within or without the limits of said town, and to acquire 
within or without the limits of said town by purchase, condemnation, 
or otherwise, whatever land may 'be necessary for acquiring, locat-
ing, establishing, maintaining, operating, extending or enlarging 
said water works: and 
(2) That it had become necessary by reason of the growth of 
said town that it enlarge its water works system, and for that pur-
pose the said town, by deed bearing date on the 9th day of N ovem-
ber, 1937, and duly of record in the Clerk's office of Page County 
in Deed Book 106, at page 212; acquired by purchase and convey-
ance from Ida L. Brown that certain tract or parcel of land lying 
and being situate about two miles east of the Town of Luray, 
familiarly known as the Brown's Mill property, containing by survey 
six and one-half acres and certain water rights _in and to what is 
locally and familiarly known as. Rite's Spring, which water rights 
were described in the following words in said , deed, to-wit, "any 
and all water rights in and to what is locally and familiarly known 
as Spring Farm, now owned by Martin Hite' s · heirs, and 
page 4 ~ which for many years past has been used by the owners 
of the aforesaid Brown's Mill property, the water rights 
above referred to are fully described and set out together with any 
and all reservations and restrictions as to the use thereof, in that 
certain deed executed by William E. ~auck and wife, to David 
Huffman, bearing date on the 28th day of February, 1886, and duly 
of recor1 in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book M, at page 325, to 
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which reference is hereby especially made, as well as to the other 
deeds hereinbefore mentioned" ; and 
( 3) That recently. when the Town of Luray sought to enlarge 
and extend its existing water works and make use of the water 
rights acquired as aforesaid from Ida L. Brown, and also to acquire 
from the heirs or assignees of Martin L. Hite, deceased, certain 
land and water rights to be used in connection with the land and 
water rights acquired from said Ida L. Brown, a controversy arose 
between the said Town of Luray and the heirs and assignees of said 
Martin Hite, deceased, as to what rights the Tow·n of Luray ac-
quired in and to the said Rite's Spring and the waters flowing there-
from, and the use of the said Town might make of the waters in 
said spring and the waters flowing therefrom, by reason of the 
alleged rights that the said heirs and assignees might have in and 
to said spring and also the rights they may have in and to the flow 
of water from said spring as lower riparian owners; and 
( 4) That the Town of Luray and the heirs and assignees of 
Martin Hite, deceased, claim title to their respective lands and water 
rights under· a common source of title, namely, V\T. E. Lauck; and 
(5) That the land and water rights acquired by the Town of 
Luray from Ida L. Brown as aforesaid are fully described and set 
forth in those certain deeds and contracts conveying title thereto 
from the time that both the land and spring were owned by W. E. 
Lau~k down to the conveyance from Ida L. Brown to the Town of 
Luray, all of which will more fully appear from certified copies of 
said deeds, which are duly of record in the Clerk's Office 
page 5 ~ of of Page County and are herewith filed as "Complain-
ant's Exhibits A to O"; inclusive, and prayed to be made 
a part hereof, namely : 
Exhibit (A) Deed of W. E. Lauck to David Huffman, dated 
February 28th, 1866, recorded in Deed Book M, at page 325 ; 
Exhibit (B) Deed of David Huffman to W. L. Lauck, dated 
November 25th, 1867, and recorded in Deed Book N, at page 120; 
Exhibit (C) Contract of David Huffman to W. E. Lauck, dated 
November 31, 1867, recorded in Deed Book N, page 271; 
Exhibit (D) Deed of W. E. Lauck to James H. Judd, dated 
June 4, 1869, recorded in Deed Book N, at page 347; 
Exhibit (E) Deed of James H. Judd to Joel S. Fisher date April 
3, 1872, recorded in Deed Book P, page 186; 
Exhibit (F) Deed of Joel S. Fisher to James H. Judd~ dated 
June 25, 1872, recorded in Deed Book P, page 215; 
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Exhibit ( G) Deed of Joel S. Fisher to James H. Judd, dated 
June 12, 1876, recorded in Deed Book S, at page 269; 
Exhibit (H) Deed of James H. Judd to Jacoh Hockman, 
Trustee, deed March 24, 1877, recorded in Deed Book T, page 139; 
Exhibit (I) Order appoint H. J. Smoot, Substituted Trustee, in 
place of Martin Hite in Deed of trust, dated Febmary 23, 1880, 
recorded in Chancery Order Book 9, at·page 283; 
Exhibit (J) Deed of H.J. Smoot, Trustee, to Benjamin Pulliam 
dated June 1, 1886, recorded· in Deed Book 10, at page 76; 
Exhibit (K) Deed. of Benjamin Pulliam to E. L. and J. Y. 
Brown, dated December 24, 1887, recorded in Deed Book 10, 
page 141; 
Exhibit (L) Deed of Benjamin· Pulliam to E. L. and J. Y. 
Brown, dated February 20, 1889, recorded in Deed Book 12, 
page 258; 
Exhibit (M) Deed of D. M. and J. Y. Brown to W. L. Brown 
dated March 15, 1904, recorded in Deed Book 52, at page J49; 
Exhibit (N) Will of W. L. Brown, devising to Ida L. Brown, 
recorded in Will Book 1.0, at page 56; · 
Exhibit (0) Deed of Ida L. Brown to Town of Luray, dated 
November· 9, 1937, recorded in Deed Book 106, at page 212; 
- and 
page 6 ~ ( 6) That the lands and water rights, if any, to said 
spring that are now owned by the heirs and assignees of 
said Martin .Hite, deceased, are fully described and set out in those 
deeds and proceedings conveying title thereto from the time that 
said land and spring were both owned by W. E. Lauck to the present 
time, as will more fully appear froin Exhibits A, B, and C, hereto-
fore filed and certified copies of which said other deeds an9 pro-
ceedings ar~ herewith filed, as "Complainant's Exhibits-· - to Z," 
both inclusive, and prayed to be read as a part hereof, as follows, 
namely: 
Exhibit (P) Deed of W. E. Lauck to David J. Patterson, dated 
October 29, 1867, recorded in Deed Book N, page 94; and. 
Exhibit ( Q) Power of Attorney of D. J. Patterson to Robert M. 
Patterson, dated November 4, 1868, recorded in Deed Book N, at 
page 256; 
Exhibit (R) Deed of Robert M. Patterson, Attorney to W. E. 
Lauck dated November 14, 1868, recorded in Deed Book N, 
page 255; 
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Exhibit (S) Deed of W. E. Lauck to Martin Hite, dated Novem-
ber· 10, 1869, recorded· in Deed Book 0, page 135; 
Exhibit (T) Deed of Noah F. Hite to C. B. Hite, Barbara Hite 
and Mary Hite, dated February 14th, 1912, recorded in Deed.Book 
67, at page 370; 
Exhibit (U) Deed of G. W. Hite to C. B., Barbara and Mary 
Hite, dated October 25, 19li, recorded in· Deed Book 68, at 
page 427; 
Exhibit (V) Deed of Annie L. Taylor to C. B., Barbara a:nd 
Mary Hite, dated October 25, 1912, recorded in Deed Book 68, 
page 428; · 
Exhibit (W) Partition of Martin Rite's estate, Chancery cause 
of C. B. Hite, &c., vs. Belle H. Broy, recorded in Deed Book 69, 
page 291 to 298, inclusive; 
Exhibit (X) Will of C. B. Hite, devised to Barbara and Mary 
Hite, recorded in Will Book 10, at page· 473; . 
Exhibit (Y) Deed of Belle Broy, &c., to Joseph and William C. 
Comer, dated November 11, · 1919, recorded in Deed 
page 7 ~ Book 77, at page 354; · 
Exhibit ( Z) Deed of William C. Comer to .T oseph 
Corrier, dated August 5th, 1926, recorded in Deed Book 88, at page 
499; and · 
( 7) That Martin Hite died a good many years ago leaving 
surviving him as his next of kin and heirs at law the following 
named children, C. B. Hite, Barbara E. Hite, Mary E. Hite, Noah 
F. Hite, George W. Hite, Annie L. Taylor, Joseph M. Hite and 
Belle H. Broy; and 
(8). That Martin Hite died seized and possessed of all the rest 
and remainder of the land known as Spring Farm and whatever 
water rights in the spring or springs had been reserved in the 
aforesaid deed from W. E. Lauck to David Huffman; and 
(9) That in the division of the Martin Hite land among· his 
children and heirs at law, which is duly of record in Deed Book No. 
69, at page 291, et seq., 6/8ths thereof was assigned to C. B. Hite! 
Barbara E. Hite and Mary E. Hite, rsths in their own right and 
~ths by purchase of }'Bth ~espectively from the following named 
brothers and sisters, namely, Noah F. Hite, George W. Hite and 
Annie L. Taylor, said share containing in the aggregate 152~ 
acres, more or less, together with 6/8ths of the reserved water that 
could flow through the 23/i inch tube as aforesaid; and 
(10) That by the last will and testament of the said~- ·B. Hite 
which is recorded in the Clerk's Office of Page County in Will Book 
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10, at page 473, all the property both real and personal of which 
the said C. B. Hite died seized and possessed passed to the said 
Barbara E. Hite and Mary E. Hite; and 
· ( 11) That one-eighth was assigned to Joseph M. Hite, con-
taining 25 acres and a 6 78 th acre detached timber tract and 78 th of 
the reserved water that could flow through the 2 ~ inch tube as 
aforesaid and the right to convey the same to the real estate assigned 
him; and 
page 8 ~ ( 12) One-eighth to Belle H. Broy, containing 35 ~ 
acres, and the 78 th interest in the reserved water that 
could flow through the 2 0 inch tube as aforesaid with the right to 
convey same to the assigned tract ; and 
, ( 13) That the said Belle H. Broy conveyed said tract or parcel 
of land and water right to Joseph and William C. Comer by deed 
bearing date on the 11th day of November, 1919, recorded in De~d 
Book 77, at page 354, and the said William C. Comer subsequent 
thereto conveyed his undivided one-half interest in said tract, etc., 
to Joseph Comer by deed dated the 5th day of August, 1926, and 
recorded in Deed Book 88, at page 499; and 
· ( 14) That several years ago the said Belle H. Broy departed 
this life intestate leaving surviving her as her next of kin and heirs 
at law the following named children, Anna Broy Martin, Bernice 
H. Broy, Charles E. Broy and John "vV. Broy, who has since de-
parted this life without issue, leaving surving him his widow, 
Harriet S. Broy; and 
( 15) That your complainants are advised that the aforesaid 
Noah F. Hite and George W. Hite departed this life several years 
ago, but your complainant is not informed as to whether or not the 
said Noah F. Hite and George W. Hite left any heirs other than 
their brothers and sisters and their nieces and nephews hereinbefore 
named and set forth. 
( 16) That your complainant is informed and believes and so 
alleges and avers that an actual controversy exists between the 
Town of Luray and the heirs and assignees of the said Martin Hite, 
deceased, which said controversy necessitates the interpretation of 
those certain deeds, wills, and proceedings hereinbefore named and 
described and made a part hereqf as Exhibits A to Z, both inclusive, 
in order to deterine the respective rights of the Town of Luray 
and- the heirs and assignees of Martin Hite, deceased, in and to 
the said land and respective water rights in and to said 
page 9 · ~ Rite's Spring and the waters flowing therefrom, and the 
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use that may be made of said water rights by each of the 
respective parties; and 
( 17) That a Court of Equity will take jurisdiction to determine 
what rights the Town of Luray acquired in and to Hite's Spring 
the waters flowing therefrom and the right the said Town may make 
of said spring and the waters flowing therefrom and to interpret and 
construe the deeds, wills and proceedings hereinbefore seth forth 
and filed as exhibits and made a part of this bill. 
In Consideration Whereof, and for as much as your complainant 
is remediless in the p~emises, save by the aid of a court of equity, 
where such matters are alone properly cognizable and relievable, he 
prays that the said Barbara E. Hite, Mary E. Hite, Joseph M. Hite, 
Anna Broy Martin, Bernice H. Broy, Charles E. Broy, Harriet S. 
Broy, Joseph Comer, Annie L. Taylor, the unknown heirs of Noah 
F. Hite, if any, and the unknown heirs of George \V. Hite, if any, 
may be made parties defendant and charged with proper process to 
answer the same, but not under oath, the oath being expressly 
waived; that proper process may issue; that an order of publication 
may issue against Anna Broy Martin, Bernice H. Broy, Charles E. 
Broy, Annie L. Taylor, the unknown heirs of Noah F. Hite, if any, 
and the unknown heirs of George W. Hite, if any, that this Court 
will determine what rights the Town of Luray acquired in and to 
Rite's Spring and the waters flowing therefrom and the right the 
said Town may make of said spring and the waters flowing there-
from; and that 'the aforesaid deeds, wills and proceedings may be 
constr.ued and interpreted ; and that, if necessary, this Court will 
take jurisdiction hereof pursuant to the provisions of Section 6140a 
of the Code of Virginia, 1936, and make an adjudication of the 
respective rights of the Town of Luray on the one hand and of the 
heirs and devisees of Martin Hite on the other hand in and to the 
aforesaid Rite's Spring, the waters flowing therefrom and the 
" riparian rights created by and under the deeds, wills, 
page 10 ~ and proceedings hereinbefore fully set forth and de-
scribed, and interpret and construe the aforesaid deeds, 
wills and proceedings, and enter the necessary orders and decrees 
adjud'icated and declaring what the rights of each party are pursuant 
and under the deeds, wills and proceedings aforesaid; that all proper 
orders, decrees and reference may be taken and had; and that your 
complainant may have all such further, other and general relief in 
the premises, as the nature of the case may require, or to equity shall 
seem meet; and they will ever pray, &c. 
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TOWN OF LURAY, by Counsel. 
FORD & KEYSER", P. Q. 
" page 11 ~ At another day to wit: January 27, 1939, Came the 
Defendants by Counsel and filed their Answer in cause, 
which Answer is in the words and figures follows, to-wit': 
page 12 ~ VIRGINIA, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF PAGE COUNTY: 
TOWN OF LURAY, VIRGINIA, 
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
versus (Answer) 
BARBARA E. /HITE, ET ALS. 
To the Honorable H. W. Bertra1ii, Judge of said Court: 
· Your respondents, Barbara E. Hite, Mary E. Hite, Joseph M. 
Hite, and Joseph Comer, for answer to a petition filed against them 
- in Your Honor's Court by the Town of Luray, Virginia, a Munici-
pal Corpo~ation, or to so much thereof as they deem it pertinent 
they should answer, answer and say: 
( 1) That your respondents are the sole owners in fee of all 
the lands and water rights of which Martin Hite died seized and 
possessed and that said Martin Hite died seized and possessed of 
the following real estate and water rights : 
a. Approximately 219 acres of land in fee, known familiarly 
as Spring Farm. 
b. The right to so much of the water from the Spring on ~aid 
· Farm as will flow through a tube two and one-half inches in di-
ameter, as a limitation or restriction upon the use of the said water 
for mill· and saw mill purposes. 
c. The right to the ordinary use of the water in the Spring 
located on said farm and the ordinary use of the water flowing 
therefrom, as a further limitation or restriction upon the use of the 
said water for mill and saw mill purposes. 
· d. The right to the remaining water in the Spring located on 
said .farm and the remaining waters flowing therefrom, subject, 
however, to the rights of the owner of what is known as Brown's 
Mill property to use the waters flowing from the said Spring for 
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mill and saw mill purposes, and subject also to the ordinary rights 
of any lower riparian owner. · 
(2) That the town of Luray, Virginia, a municipal corporation, 
which instituted these proceedings, having purchased the Brown's 
Mill property as alleged in its Bill ·of Co.mplaint, obtained 
page 13 ~ no rights or privileges in and to the waters in the Spring 
located on what is known as Spring Farm and the waters 
flowing therefrom-other than the rights of a lower riparian owner 
to use the waters flowing over or through its ·1ands as such riparian 
ownern, for the reason that the mill and saw mill upon said Brown'~ 
Mill property had long prior to said purchase been abandoned; and 
that said Town of Luray now has no rights or privileges in and to 
the waters in the said Spring and the waters flowing therefrom other 
than the rights of a lower., riparian owner as aforesaid. 
( 3) That by virtue of several subsequent conveyances after the 
death of the aforesaid Martin Hite, and a partition among the heirs 
at law of the said Martin Hite, deceased, as will appear from the 
complainant's exhibits filed herein, the respective interests of your 
respondents herein are as fpllows : 
a. Joseph M. Hite, owner in fee of approximately 310 ·acres 
of land, being a part of Spring Farm; owner of one-eighth ( % ) of 
the water from the said Spring that will flow through a tube two 
and one-half inches in diameter, and the right to locate pumping 
machinery near said Springs for the purpose of pumping water to 
his-said land. 
b. Joseph Comer, owner in fee of approximately 350 acres of 
land, being a part of Spring Farm, owner of one-eighth ( % ) of the 
water from the said Spring that will flow through a tube two and 
one-half inches in diameter, and the right to locate pumping ma-
chinery near said Springs for the purpose of pumping water to his 
said land; and owner of the right to water stock in the water flowing 
from said Springs to the Mill race. 
c. Barbara E. Hite and Mary E. Hite, joint owners in fee of 
approximately 152% acres of_ land, known as Spring Farm and on 
which the Spring, sought to be condemned by said Town of Luray 
in a prior proceeding, is located; joint owners absolutely and in .fee 
of the water in the spring or springs located on said Farm and the 
water flowing therefrom subject, however, to the rights of the 
Town of Luray as a lower riparian owner to use the water flowing 
over or through its lands as such and the rights of any 
page 14 ~ other riparian owner, and also subject to the rights and 
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privileges in favor of the said Joseph M. Hite and the 
said Joseph Comer as above set forth. 
( 4) That all of the aforesaid interests of your respondents in 
the lands and water rights hereinbefore set forth and described 
appear from the exhibits filed by said Town of Luray with its Bill 
filed in this. suit. 
( 5) That from the 10th day of November, 1869, until his death 
in the year 1904, Martin Hite openly claimed the rights and fully 
exercised the same in and to the spring or springs located on what 
is known as Spring Farm and the waters flowing therefrom which 
are hereinabove set forth and described as belonging to him. 
( 6) That since the death of the said Martin Hite, his heirs and 
your respondents, Barbara E. Hite and Mary E. Hite, up to and 
including the present time have been openly claiming and exercising 
the rights in and to the spring or springs located on said Spring 
Farm and the waters flowing theref orni, herein before fully set 
forth and described -as belonging to them. 
And now having fully answered your respondents pray that they 
may be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs in this behalf 
expended. 
HARRY R. TAYLOR 
J. LYNN LUCAS 
A. ERWIN HACKLEY 
Counsel. 
BARBARA E. HITE 
MARYE. HITE 
JOSEPH M. HITE 
JOSEPH COMER 
BY Counsel. 
page 15 ~ At another day to-wit: April 11, 1939 the Opinion 
of the Court was filed in words and figures, as fol~ 
lows, to-wit: 
page 16 ~ TOWN OF LURAY, 
versus OPINION 
BARBARA E. HITE, &c. 
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By de~d of February 28, 1866, Wm. Edwin Lauck conveyed to 
David Huffman a tract of 134 acres by metes and bounds, situate 
in .Page County, near Luray. Following the description of the land, 
the deed further recites: "The said grantee is to enjoy fully the 
water for the mill and sa.w mill upon said (land) hereinbef ore 
described as granted to him, but is to use the same in such manne~ 
as n9t in any way to injure or damage the land or property retained 
by the grantor. In order to the more perfect enjoyment of said 
wate.r right said grantee is to have the privilege of repairing the 
race leading through the lands of the grantor but is not to change 
the location of the same, said grantee is also to have the right to cut 
a race from Dry Run to said race on the water flowing into the same 
through the land of the said grantor "-setting forth restrictions as 
to depts, etc., and then: The said grantor reserves to himself in 
thi's. sale the right of the ordinary use of the wafer of the spring 
which flpws into said mill race. Also the right to so much of the 
water of said spring as will flow through a tube two and a half 
inches in diameter." Then "reserves a road," etc. 
Then by deed of November 25, 1867, David Huffman, the 
grantees above, conveys back to Lauck, the grantor above, a one-
undivided half of 12 Acres and 30 poles (part of said 134 Acres) 
"with a merchant mill, saw and other improvements," "together 
with one-half of all the water privileges conveyed to the said David 
Huffman by the said Wm. E. Lauck by the deed aforesiad." 
Under contract of November 30, 1868, the said Lauck acquires 
from said Huffman the other half of said mill property, with. 
rights, etc. 
By deed of June 4, 1869, said vV. E. Lauck conveys this 12 Acres 
and 30 Poles to James H. Judd, "together with all the 
pag~ 17 ~ water and other privileges, and subject to all the reserva-
tions embraced and described in a deed from the said 
Wm. E. Lauck an'd wife to the said David Huffman, bearing date 
on the 28th day of February, 1866 .... And also the same privileges 
conveyed to the said Wm. E. Lauck by the said David Huffman .... 
This mill property then by various mesne conveyances passed to 
the estate of W. L. Brown and by his wiil to Ida L. Brown and she 
by deed of November 9, 1937, conveyed 6~ acres of the land 
together with rights to the Town of Luray, referring to the deed 
of February 28th, 1866, from Lauck to Huffman for a description 
of water rights, and reservations and restrictions. 
When_ Lauck convey~d to Huffman the 134 acre tract whkh w:a.s 
( according to the plat filed in the cause) made up by three con-
;-
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
tiguous tracts, viz : The mill tract of 12 acres and 30 poles; A t~act 
of 6 Acres, 3 R. and 21 poles, lyfog between the mill lot and the 
turnpike, and a tract of 108 acres, lying north of the mill tract, he 
remained the owner of the land which lies east of the turnpike and 
on which is located the spring and is the source of the stream sup-
plying water for the mills, and also retained ownership of the lands 
lying west of the pike and north of the 6 Acres, 3 R. and 21 pole 
tract through which runs the stream to the mill tract. 
Before Huffman reconveyed to Lauck the 12 Acre Mill tract, 
Huffman had conveyed to Lauck by deed dated October 1, 1866, 
• the 108 acre portion of the 134 acre tract, but said conveyance con-
tained the following expressed reservation and exception : "But the 
said David Huffman reserves to himself all the water privileges and 
the means for using and' enjoying the same which were conveyed 
to him by the said Wm. E. Lauck in the deed aforesaid." 
However, before Lauck conveyed the mill tract to Judd by deed 
of June 4, 1869, he (Lauck) had by deed of October 29th, 1867, 
conveyed all the surrounding lands, exclusive of the mill. tract, to 
David J. Patterson. This last conveyance is subject to the water & 
Mill prinvileges her~tofore granted to David Huffman. At that 
time Huffman had· not sold the inill tract to Lauck. The sale to 
Patterson was 274 acres ( exclusive of mill tract acreage) called 
Spring Farm. Patterson reconveyed this tract to Lauck November 
14: 1868, and Lauck then conveyed to Martin Kite by deed dated 
November 10, 1869. · 
· While the stream in its course to the mill tract runs along and 
close to the northern lines of the 6 Acres 3 R., and .21 
page 18 ~ pole tract it remains entirely on the land retained by 
Lauck from where it leaves the spring until it reaches 
the eastern line of the above mentioned 108 Acre tract, a short dis-
tance. east of a corner of the mill tract; after which it passes· over 
said 108 Acre tract, until it reaches another corner of the mill tract, 
a short clistance north of the mill pond ; from thence it passes over 
the mill tract to Dry Run. 
Dry Run has its source somewhere east of the L~uck Lands lying 
east of the Turnpike-the spring being on this-and after crossing 
the pike ·at a point some distance south of the spring, passes through 
the lands retained by Lauck, over a course not far removed from 
the southern lines o.f the 6 Acres, 3 R's., and 21 poles of the mill 
tract; and after crossing the western portion of the mill tract con-
tinues its westerly course over the Lauck Janos. 
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Before Lauck made the conveyance to Huffman, he owned the 
spring and the lands surrounding it, the bed of the stream and the 
land on both sides thereof, the lands whereon the mills and the dam 
were located. He used the spring and the water flowing from it, as 
he pleased, subject only to the rights of any lower riparian owner. 
The operation of the mills depended wl_101ly upon the flow of water 
from th~ spring. 
Therefore, whatever rights attached to and became appurtenant 
to the mill tract under and by virtue of the deed from Lauck to 
Huffman are now attached to and appurtenant to 6~ Acres, part·of 
original mill tract, owned by the Town of Luray, subject to reserva-
tions and restrictions set out in said deed. · 
What these rights and reservations are depends upon the purpose 
and object of the parties to that deed, gathered from the language 
used; giving to such .language, in case of doubt or ambiguity, an 
interpretation favorable to the grantee and most strongly against 
the grantor; and, · reading the deed as a whole, in the light of the 
circumstances under which the deed originated. Smith v .. Bailey, 
141 Va., 757 ;Stephen Putney Shoe Co., v. Richmond, &c., Ry. Co., 
116 Va., 211; Elterich v. Leicht Real Estate Co:., 130 Va., 224. 
The deed from Lauck to Patterson conveyed the 27 4 by metes 
and bounds within the exterior lines .of which lies. t}le Huffman mill 
tract, and made the conveyance "subject to the water and ~ill privi-
lege-s heretofore. granted to David Huffman." 
page 19 ~ After Patterson had. reconveyed to him, Lauck . con,. 
veyed to Martin Hite the lands, "together with all the 
privileges of water from the spring on said farm reserved by said 
Wm. Edwin Lauck in his deed to James H. Judd." . 
The deed to Judd was for 12 Acres, "together with all the water 
and othe·r privileges, and subject to all other reservations embraced 
and described in a deed from the said ... Lauck ... to the said 
David Huffman.'' . 
The-rights granted in the Huffman deed are: "to enjoy fully the 
water-right for the mill and saw mill"; (2.) "In order to the mo.re 
perfect enjoyment of said water right to have the privilege of re-
- pairing the race leading through the lands · of the grantor'~; ( 3) 
"Right to cut race from Dry Run," etc. The Reservations are: 
( 1) Grantor reserves to himself the ordinary use of the water of the 
spring which flows into said mill race. (2) also the right to so 
much of the water of said spring as will flow through a tube two 
and one-half inches in diameter; ( 3) Roadwa)'· 
It is not necessary for the purposes here to set out the restrictions. 
..:. 
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There is nothing in the record to show the actual user by Lauck 
and his successors in title to the 274 Acres of either of these reserva-
tions. But all subsequent conveyances of the 274 Acres grant all 
the privil~ges of water from the spring reserued by Lauck in his 
deed to Judd for the mill tract, and no other right. 
The report and decree, especially the decree, of August 18, 1914, 
in the suit for the partition of the Martin Hite Lands, definitely 
establish recognition on the part of the parties to that suit, of a 
vested property right in the owner of the niill tract to the spring, 
or springs, as the case may be, subject to the right to the owner of 
the surrounding land, to take therefrom so nrnch water as u,jll flow 
through a pipe two and one-half inches in diameter. 
When Lauck conveyed the mill tract to Huffman and later to 
Judd, had the deed been silent concerning water rights, the grantees 
as lower riparian owners would have become, by operation of law, 
entitled to have the natural flow of the water of the spring to their 
lands, undiminished in volume except as affected by reasonable and 
necessary use by the upper 01.uner in the exercise of his riparian 
rights; and Lauck as upper riparian owner would have 
page 20 ~ been entitled to the reasonable use of the water in the 
spring and as it flowed through his lands, for ordinary 
domestic and agricultural purposes and for the extraordinary, or 
artificial, purpose of developing power from the flow. 
While in the Huffman deed what I have designated "stream" is 
ref err.ed to as "the race," I understand that all parties agree that 
the bed over which. the water flows is the natural bed of the stream. 
These respective riparian rights of user are in no sense easements, 
but are qualified property rights incident to the ownership of the 
soil through or by which the waters of a stream flow. 27 R. C. L. 
pp. 1079, &c., ss 23, 24, &c. Gordonsville v. Zim, 129 Va. 542. 
If no rights in the water of the spring other than those arisii;ig 
from riparian ownership, were intended to pass by grant to the 
owner of the mill tract, then the provisions of the deed relative to 
the enjoyment of the water right are without effect. Even the pro-
vision against use in such manner as not to cause damage to other 
lands of grantor, would have no force or meaning. 
The reservation for ordinary use would be surplusage, but the 
reservation to extract from the spring would have some force. 
Taking up and interpreting the several sentl;!nces, phrases and 
w.ords in the paragraph relating to water rights and reservations, 
found in this deed, and giving effect to the whole, I have reached 
the conclusion hereafter set out. 
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In the first place, it seems clear that the grantor recognized two 
things: 
. ( 1 ) !hat practically all the water of the spring must of neces-
s1 ty be used in an efficient operation of the mills. This is made 
certain by the following clause: "said grantor is also to have the 
right to cut a race from Dry Run." 
( 2) That whatever rights not simply riparian, that were to be 
appurtenant to the mill property, must be fixed by the deed. 
The water right actually intended to be created, fixed and granted 
is to be measured by the language used taken in conjunction with 
objects sought to be obtained. 
page 21 ~ The grantor says: "The grantee is to enjoy fully the 
water right," with no limitation other than such use shall 
in no way damage or injure the lands retained by the grantor; and 
further says: "In order to the more perfect enjoyment of said 
water right" the grantee is to have privilege of repairing race, etc., 
and to have the right to cut a race from Dry Run; and then reserves 
to himself "in this sale" the right to ordinary use of the water of 
the spring which flows into said mill race and the right to so much 
of the water of said spring as will flow through a two and one-half 
inch tube. 
When this language is considered along with the facts surround-· 
ing and in the light of the purpose intended to be obtained, viz., to 
secure to the grantee an amount of water sufficient to properly 
operate his mills located on the then 12 Acre tract, the conclusion 
must be as follows : 
( 1) That the grantees of the mill tract-first Huffman and then 
Judd-by virtue of the provisions of the Huffman deed, took as .an 
appurtence to said tract a property rig/it in and to the spring and all 
the water flowing therefrom,, subject only to (a) the right to with-
draw and use and not return to the stream or spring, so much water 
as will flow through a two and one-half inch tube, and ( b) the 
reserved right of ordinary use of the water for domestic purposes 
only as it flows through the lands which the plat now indicates 
belong to Mary E. Hite and C. B. Hite. 
This right as construed above is not merely personal to the im-
mediate grantee, nor is it strictly speaking a mere easement attach-
ing to the mill tract and appurtenant thereto. It is right of property 
to the 1.oater in the spring, practically and to all intents and pur-
poses, a grant of the spring, sbject to the reservations as to the use 
of the water, although the deed does not in terms convey the land 
covered by the water or the banks of the spring. 
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One of the essential qualities of an easement, is: "that there must 
be two distinct tenements, the dominant_ to w1l,ich the right belongs, 
and the servient upon which the obligation is imposed." 19 C. J. 
p. 864; French v. Williams 82 Va. 462. · 
The grant found in the conveyance under consideration eliminates 
the servient tenement, because by it the granter parts 
page 22 ~ with all property in the spring except the right to with-
draw a certain amount of water therefrom-an easement 
( ?) by reservat.ion as to which the grantor's other lands form th~ 
dominant tenement and the spring the servient property. Lauck by 
his ~ubsequent conveyance of the 274 Acre tract to Martin Hite, tm-
doubtedly recognized the fact that the_ only property he had in the 
spring was the right to withdraw water therefrom when this deed 
declares in the following words: "The said Wm. Edwin Lauck and 
... his wife, do grmzt unto the said Martin Hite, a certain tract ... 
being a portion of the farm called the Spring Farm ... containing 
. . . acres, more or less, together with all the privileges of water 
from the spring on the said farm reserved by the said Wm. Edwin 
Lauck in his deed to.James H. Judd." (underscoring added}. Here 
there is an expressed grant of .reserved privileges only, to the ex-
clusion of any other privilege. ( Expressio uni us est exclusio al-
' terius.) These are the rights that Martin Hite took under that deed 
and so recognized· by the granting clauses of the several deeds by 
and between the several heirs of Martin Hite. 
But suppose the claim advanced by respondents, that the Lauck-
Huffman-Judd deeds must be interpreted so that no greater right 
to the spring was granted thereby than an easement to the water 
flowing from the spring, for particular purposes, such easement must 
attach to and be appurtenant to the mill tract as the dominant tene-
ment-as a covenant running with said land to the full extent of 
the grant, and t'1e· right to easement would embrace all the water in 
the spring ·not actually withdrawn as limited by the language of the 
reservation. · 
Complainants · contend that the reservations in the deed from 
Lauck to Huffman were only reservations for his own personal use, 
because the reservation is to the granter "himself." 
I am unable to agree with this interpretation of the language of 
the deed, because as I view it, such interpretation would be contrary 
to the intention of the parties as gathered from the sentences, clauses 
and phrases of the portion of the deed dealing with the rights 
granted and reserved. In interpreting the same to determine the 
rights granted, I have found that the intention was to grant full 
Mary E. Hite et als v. Town of Luray, Virginia 35 
enjoyment of all the water in and flowing from the spring subject 
to certain reservations, and I think it is equally apparent 
page 23 ~ that the grantor intended· to retain part of the powers 
he previously exercised in the use of the water in the 
spring and as it flowed therefrom through his lands not for his 
personal benefit alone but for the benefit of the lands he retained as 
well. Had he not so intended, instead of granting a "water right" 
he would have included within the boundaries of the land granted 
the spring and the bed and banks of the stream. 
What could have been the purpose of retaining the narrow strip 
of land through which the stream runs along the northern lines of 
the 6 Acres 3 R's, and 21 Pole tract, if it were not to preserve the 
powers of riparian user which attach to all riparian ownership? 
Having retained title to the land through which the stream flows, 
in· furtherance of the expressed purpose of securing the full ( and 
more perfect) enjoyment of the use of the water, to the grantee of 
the mill. tract, he limits his riparian rights to only t/i.e ordinary use 
of the water of the stream. 
It is unreasonable to believe that Lauck by his use of the words: 
"the grantor reserves to himself," intended to restrict the reserved 
rights and for his personal benefit only. Had that been the pur-
pose of the parties to th~ deed, why was _not the instrument so 
drawn, that by simple and direct language the bed and banks of the 
spring and of the stream would have been by proper description 
i~cluded in the lands conveyed,· and the desired rights retained and 
restricted? Certainly after including within the sale, practically all 
the water in the spring and.agreeing to limit his right of user of the 
water in the stream to ordinary use there appears no substantial 
reason why the deed would not have been drawn as indicated above 
if, upon the termination of the_ period of personal user by Lauck, it 
was intended that the whole volume of the water in the spring and 
stream should become the property of the owners of the mill tract 
free from any right of user by the owners of the lands on which is 
found the spring through which runs the. stream ; and further 
when it is considered that a taking away from the retained lands, 
the benefit of these rights, would result in a material depreciation 
of the sale and ownership values of said lands, it seems conclusive 
that the use of the word, ''himself," in connection with the reserva-
tions was not intended to be interpreted so as to limit the 
page 24 ~ enjoyment of said rights, to the grantor in the deed, but 
was intended to relate to the ownership of the lands for 
the benefit of which the rights were reserved. 
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Therefore, my conclusion is that the Town of Luray under its 
deed from Ida L. Brown is entitled to all the rights and privileges 
granted by W. E. Lauck to James H. Judd which rights and privi-
leges are set out in the deed from Lauck to Huffman, subject to 
the rights reserved to the grantor in the Huffman deed; and speci-
fically as to the water in and flowing from the spring that Judd 
atquired under his deed, and the Town of Luray now owns, a right 
of property to all the water in the spring except so much thereof 
as may be necessary for the enjoyment b~., Lauck and his assigns 
for the reservations made by Lauck in his deed to Huffman, towit: 
( 1) The right to withdraw from the spring so much of the water 
therein as will flow through a pipe two and one-half inches in 
diameter; and ( 2) the right to use of so much of the water flowing 
from the spring as may be ·necessary to meet the ordinary (domestic) 
. needs of the owners of the lands through which it passes. Both the 
rights and privileges granted and those reserved are considered by 
me as appurtenant to and running as covenants with the lands 
granted and retained respectively. 
If these reserved rights were not intended to run with the land 
but were intended only for the personal benefit of Lauck, then full 
riparian rights attach both to the spring and the stream. The very 
fact that the title to a11d possession of the lands on which the spring 
is and through which the stream runs, when considered along with 
the nature of the rights reserved, dearly show that Lauck had no 
intention of parting with all riparian rights but .only to limit the 
extent of the use of the same. The extent of the reserved use of the 
stream is less than usually enjoyed by riparian owners and the 
reserved use of the spring is greater. 
H. W. B. 
page 25 ~ At another Day to-wit: April 11, 1939, a Decree was 
entered in said cause in words and figu~es as follows, 
To-wit: 
page 26 ~ IN THE. CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE 
COUNTY, VIRGINIA. 
TOWN OF LURAY, VIRGINIA, 
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
•;_,ersus (DECREE) 
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BARBARA E. HITE, MARY E. HITE, JOSEPH M. HITE, 
ANNA BROY MARTIN, BERNICE H. BROY, CHARLES 
E. BROY, HARRIET S. BROY, JOSEPH COMER, 
ANNIE L. TAYLOR, UNKNOWN HEIRS OF 
NOAH F. HITE, IF ANY, AND THE 
UNKNOWN HEIRS OF GEORGE 
W. HITE, IF ANY. 
This cause came on this 11th day of April, 1939, to be heard, 
upon the complainant's bill and the exhibits filed therewith; proof of 
legal service of proper process on the respondents, Barbara E. Hite, 
Mary E. Hite, Joseph M. Hite, and Joseph Comer in proper person; 
upon the answer of said four defendants to said bill of complaint and 
the general replication thereto; proof of legal service of proper 
p~ocess on the respondent, Harriet S. Broy, in person, who has 
failed and still fails to plead, demur, or answer the said bill, which 
is taken for confessed as to her; proof of legal service by publica-
tion and posting of proper summons by publication on the non-
resident defendants, Anna Broy Martin, Bernice H. Broy, Charles 
E. Broy, and Annie L. Taylor, and the unknown heirs of Noah F. 
Hite, if any, and the unknown heirs of George Vv. Hite, if any, 
who have failed, and still fail, to appear, plead, demur, or answer 
the said bill, which is taken for confessed as to them; the _said cause 
set for hearing; and was argued by. counsel. , 
It being suggested to the Court that Barbara E. Hite, one of the 
parties defendant in this cause has since the institution and service 
of process in this cause departed this life leaving a last will and tes-
tament, which was duly admitted to probate in the Clerk's Office 
of the Circuit Court of Page County, Virginia, on the 3r.d day of 
April, 1939, and that she devised and bequeathed unto Mary E. Hite 
all of the estate, both real and personal, in fee simple and abso-
lutely, on consideration whereof, the Court doth adjudge, order 
and decree that this cause be, and the same is hereby 
page 27 ~ abated as to the said Barbara E. Hite, deceased, and 
that the same be and is · hereby revised against the said 
fyfary E. Hite, as the devisee of the said Barbara E. Hite, deceased. 
It appearing to the Court that by deed bearing date February 
28th, 1866, William Edwin Lauck conveyed to David Huffman a 
tract of land of 134 acres by metes and bounds, lying and being 
situate on the North side of the old New Market and Sperryville 
Turnpike about a mile or mile and one-half east of the Town of 
Luray, Page County, Virginia, that following the description of 
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said land said deed contains the following language : "The said 
grantee is to enjoy fully the water right for the mill and saw mill 
upon said (land) hereinbefore described as granted to him, but is 
to use the same .in such manner as not in any way to injure or 
damage the land or other property retained by the grantor. In 
order to the more perfect enjoyment of said water right said 
grantee is to have the privilege of repairing the race leading through 
the lands of the grantor but is not to change the location of the 
same, ·said grantee is also to have the right to cut a race from Dry 
Run to said race on the water flowing into the same through the 
land of the said grantor five feet wide and five feet deep but is to 
construct the embankments of the same so as to prevent overflow at 
any time, and to secure the aperture through which the water is to 
flow from said run into said race so that at no time shall the water 
passing through the same exceed two feet in depth and five in width. 
The said grantor reserves to himself in this sale the right of the 
ordinary use of the water of the spring which flows into said mill 
race; Also the right to so much of the water of said spring as will 
flow through a tube two and a half inches in diameter" ; when Lauck 
conveyed to Huffman the 134 acre tract which was ( according to 
the plat filed in the cause) made up by three contiguous tracts, viz : 
The mill tract of 12 acres and 30 poles; A tract of 6 acres, 3 R 
and 21 poles, lying between the mill lot and the turnpike, and a tract 
of 108 acres, lying north of the mill tract, Lauck remained the 
owner of the land which lies east of the turnpike and on which is 
located the spring and is the source of the stream supplying water 
for the mills, and' also retained ownership of the lands 
page 28 ~ lying west of the pike and north of the 6 acres, 3 R. and 
21 pole tract, through which retained land runs what is 
herein referred to as the mill race to the mill tract ; that by deed 
dated October 1, 1866, David Huffman reconveyed to William E. 
Lauck a portion of the aforesaid 1.34 acre tract by metes and bounds, 
said conveyance was made upon the following expressed reservation 
and exception: "But_ the said David Huffman reserves to himself all 
the water privileges and the means for using and enjoying the same 
which were conveyed to him by the said William E. Lauck in the 
deed aforesaid; that by deed dated October 29, 1867, said Lauck 
conveyed .all the surrounding lands, exclusive of the mill tract, con-
taining 274 acres to David J. Patterson, said conveyance being 
made "subject to the water~ and mill privileges heretofore granted 
to David Huffman," and at which said time Huffman had not yet 
sold and reconveyed the mill tract to Lauck ; that then by deed of 
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November 25, 1867, David Huffman, the grantee above, conveys 
back to Lauck, the grantor above, a one-undivided half of 12 acres 
and 30 poles (part of said 134 acres) "with a merchant mill, saw 
and other improvements,'' "together with one-half of all the water 
privileges conveyed to the said David Huffman by the said Wm. 
E. Lauck by the deed aforesaid" ; that under contract of N ovem-
ber 30, 1868, the said Lauck acquires from said Huffman the 
other half of said mill property, with rights, etc.; that by deed 
of June 4, 1869, said W. E. Lauck convey's this 12 acres and 
30 poles to James H. Judd, "together with all the water and 
other privileges, and subject to all the reservations embraced 
and described in a deed from the said Wm. E. Lauck and wife to 
the said David Huffman, bearing date on the 28tp day of February, 
1866 .... And also the same privileges conveyed to the said Wm. 
E. Lauck by the said David Huffman . . . ; that this mill property 
then by various mesne conveyances passed to the estate of W. L. 
Brown and by his will to Ida L. Brown and she by deed 9f N ovem-
ber 9, 1937, conveyed 60 acres of the land together with rights to 
the Town of Luray, referring to the deed of February 28th, 1866, 
from Lauck to Huffman for a description of water rights, and 
reservations and restrictions; that when Lauck conveyed to Huffman 
~he 134 acre tract which was ( according to the plat filed 
page 29 ~ in the cause) made up by three contiguous tracts, viz : 
The mill tract of 12 acres and 30 poles; a tract of 6 
acres, 3 R, and 21 poles, lying between the mill lot and. the turnp1ke, 
and a tract of 1.08 acres, lying north of the Mill Tract, Lauck re-
mained the owner of the land which lies east of the turnpike and 
on which is located the spring and is the source of the stream sup-
plying water for the mills, and also retained ownership of the lands 
lying west of the pike and north of the 6 acres 3 R and.21 pole tract, 
through which retained land runs what is herein ref erred to as the 
. mill race to the mill tract; that the aforesaid Patterson reconveyed 
the said 274 acre tract, subject to all mill and water privileges to 
Lauck by deed dated November 14, 1868; that then by deed bearing 
date November 10, 1869, the said .Lauck ·conveyed said tract of land 
to Martin Hite and also all the privileges of water from the spring 
on the said farm reserved by the said Lauck in his deed to James 
H. Judd; that while the stream in its course to the mill tract runs 
along and close to the northern lines of the 6 Acres, 3 R., and 21 
pole tract it remains entirely on the land. retained by Lauck from 
where it leaves the spring until it reaches the eastern line of tho 
above mentioned 108 acre tract, a short distance east of a comer of 
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the Mill tract ; after which it passes over said 108 acre tract until 
it reaches another corner of the mill tract, a short distance north of 
the mill pond ; from thence it passes over the mill tract to Dry Run; 
that Dry Run has its source somewhere east of the Lauck lands 
_ lying east of the Turnpike-the spring being on this-and after 
crossing the pike at a point some distance northwest of the spring, 
passes through the lands retained by Lauck, over a -course not far 
removed from the southern lines of the 6 Acres, 3 R's and 21 poles 
and of the mill tract; and after crossing the western portion of the 
mill tract continues its westerly course over the Lauck Lands; that 
before Lauck made the conveyance to Huffman, he owned the spring 
and the lands surrounding it, the bed of the stream and the land 
on both sides thereof, the lands whereon the mills and the dam 
were located. He used the spring and the water flowing from it, 
as he pleased, subject only to the rights of any lower riparian 
owner. The operation of the· mills depended wholly- upon the flow 
of w~ter from the Spring; that the aforesaid tract of 
page 30 ~ 27 4 acres of land, together with the reserved water rights 
conveyed by Lauck to Martin Hite, were partitioned and 
divided among the heirs at law of said Martin Hite in that chancery 
cause entitled C. B. Hite &c., vs. Belle H. Broy, &c., lately pending 
in the Circuit Court for Page County, Virginia, by that certain 
decree entered therein on tbe. 25th day of April, 1914, which is 
duly of record in the Clerk's Office of Page County in Deed Book 
69, at pages 291, etc., that Lot No. 1 was assigned to Jos. M. Hite, 
containing 25 acres of cleared land and 60 acres of timber land, 
Lot No. 2, was assigned to Belle H. Broy which contained 35 0 
acres, and Lot No. 3, was assigned jointly to C. B. Hite, Barbara 
E. Hite and Mary E. Hite, which contains 152% acres; that there 
was also assigned to the said Belle H. Broy a one-eighth part of the 
water that would flow through a two and one-half inch tube and 
also the right to water stock in the said stream flowing from the 
spring at a point where a ten-foot lane touched said mill stream 
just northeast of the mill tract; that there was also assigned to the 
said Jos. M. Hite, a one-eighth part of the water that would flow 
through a two and one-half inch tube ; that all the rest and residue 
of the water privileges reserved by the said William E. Lauck in 
his conveyances of the mill property and conveyed by the said Lauck 
to Martin Hite were assigned to the said ,C. B., Barbara E., and 
Mary E. Hite; that the said Belle H. Broy subsequently _conveyed 
Lot No. 2 with said water rights to Jos. Comer ; that the said 
C. B. Hite died several years ago a!)d devised all his interest in 
l/ 
! 
I 
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Lot No. 3 and said water rights to Barbara E. and Mary E. Hite; 
that said· Barbara E. Hite just recently died and devised all her 
rights in said Lot No. 3 together with said water rights to the said 
Mary E. Hite; that the contriversy has arisen between the Town 
of Luray and the heirs and assigns of the said Martin Hite over 
the respective rights in and to the spring or springs aforesaid and 
the waters flowing therefrom by reason of the several conveyances, 
etc., hereinbefore set forth; and that the Town of Luray filed this 
chancery cause pursuant to Section 6140a of the Code of Virginia, 
1936, in order to obtain an adjudication of the respective rights of 
the Town of Luray on the one hand and of the heirs and assigns of 
Martin Hite on the other hand in and to the aforesaid 
page 31 ~ spring or springs and the waters flowing therefrom arid 
the riparian rights created by and under the deeds, wills·, 
and proceedings hereinbefore fully set forth and described, on 
consideration whereof, and for reasons fully set forth in its written 
opinion this day filed with the records of this cause, which is hereby 
made a part of this decree as fully and completely as if said written 
opinion were herein written at large and in ipsa verba, the Court is 
of the opinion and doth so decide and adji1dge that (A) what ever 
rights attach to and became appurtenant to the mill tract under and 
by virtue of the deed from Lauck to Huffman are now attached to 
-and appurtenant to the 6_Yi acre tract, part of the original mill tract, 
now owned by the Town of Luray; that (B) the rights granted in 
the deed aforesaid from Lauck to Huffman are: ( 1) "To enjoy 
fully the water right from the mill and saw mill"; ( 2) "In order 
to the more perfect enjoyment of said water right-to have the 
privilege of repairing the race leading through the lands of the 
granter" ; ( J) "The right to cut a race from Dry Run to said 
race or the waters flowing into the same through the land of the 
said granter-" ; that ( C) the water rights reserved by said Lauck 
in said deed to Huffman are: ( 1) "The granter reserves to.himself 
in this sale the right of the ordinary use of the water of the spring 
which flows into said mill race; ( 2) "Also the right to so much of 
the water of said spring as will flow through a tube two and a half 
inches in diameter" ; that ( d) the report and decree, especially the 
decree of August 18, 1914, in the suit for the partition of the 
Martin Hite lands, namely, C. B. Hite and others vs. Belle H. Broy 
and others, definitely establish recognition on the part of the parties 
to that suit, (namely, the heirs at law of Martin Hite, who was the 
immediate grantee of \Villiam E. Lauck), of a vested property right 
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in the owner of the mill -tract to the spring, or springs, as the case 
may be, subject to the right to the owner of the surrounding land, to 
take therefrom so much water as will flow through a pipe two and a 
half ,inches in diameter; that (E) in the deed· from Lauck to Huff-
man, Lauck conveyed· a part of his riparian rights of user in the 
stream formed by the water flowing from said spring through the 
lands not conveyed but retained by him; that ( F) the 
page 32 ~ reserved riparian rights of user in the water of the 
stream flowing · from said spring are only "the right to 
the ordinary use of the water of the spring which flows into the 
said mill race" but do not embrace any right for the extraordinary 
or artificial purpose of developing power from the flow or such 
related use that might. exist if Lauck had not granted a part of his 
riparian rights ; ( G) that practically all the water of the spring must 
of necessity be used and was necessary in an efficient operation of 
the mills; that (H) the grantees of the mill tract by virtue of the 
prqvisions of the Huffman deed, took as a right appurtenant to said 
mill tract a property right, ( as distinguished from a mere easement 
only), in and to the spring and all the water flowing therefrom, 
subject only to (a) the right to withdraw from the spring and use 
and not return to the stream or spring, so much water as will flow 
through a two and one-half inch tube; and ( b) the right of ordinary 
use of the water for ·domestic purposes only as it flows through the 
lands· which the plat shows belongs to C. B., Barbara E. and Mary 
E. Hite, now owned entirely by Mary E. Hite; that (I) the water 
rights belonging to the grantees of the mill tract" as construed above 
are not merely personal to the immediate grantee, nor is it, strictly 
speaking, a mere easement attaching to the mill tract and appur-
tenant thereto but is a right of property to the water fo the spring, 
practically and to all intents and purposes, a grant of the spring, 
subject to the reservations as to the use of the water; that (J) the 
water rights and privileges reserved by \,Villiam E. Lauck were 
not personal rights but were rights appurtenant to the 27 4 acres 
remaining in the ownership of said \V. E. Lauck when he conveyed 
the inill tract to Huffman or Judd; that ( K) the said William E. 
Lauck attempted and intended only to convey such water rj'ghts and 
privileges to the said Martin Hite as he had expressly reserved in 
. the conveyance of the mill property to Judd, and the ·Court doth 
a<;cordingly further adjudge, order and decree, (first), that the 
town of Luray now owns a right of property to all the water in 
the. spring or springs except so much thereof as may be necessary 
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for the enjoyment by the assigns of W. E. Lauck of the reservations 
made by Lauck in his deed to Huffman or Judd; (second), that the 
said water rights .created in the d~ed from Lauck to_ Huff-
page 33 ~ man or Judd are not mere easements but are a vested 
qualified right of property; (third), that the rights re-
served by Lauck as aforesaid are-as follows, namely, (a) the right 
to withdraw from the spring or springs so much of the water therein 
as will flow through a pipe two and one;;.half inches in diameter; 
(b) the right to use so much of the water in the stream flowing 
from the spring as may be necessary to meet the ordinary doinestic 
needs of the owners of the lands through which it passes;· (fourth), 
that the reserved right described in 3a is not a riparian right at all 
but is separate and distinct from any ownership of land abutting 
upon said spring or stream but is an easement appurtenant to the 
27 4 acre tract with the water in the spring the servient tenement; 
(fifth), that the right to the use of the water that will flow through 
a two and. one-half inch tube is the right to withdraw so much water 
as would naturally flow through a two and one-half i~ch tube with-
out the aid of any artificial stimulus or means; (sixth), that .the 
reserved use for ordinary purposes described in 3b is a··restricted 
riparian right and is a right appurtenant to ·the said 274 acre tract, 
or so much thereof as may be riparian; (seventh), that the reserva~ 
tion for the ordinary use as abov~ described is a restricted riparian 
right and excluQes the full riparian. user for the extraordinary or 
artificial purposes of developing power from the flow; or such·other 
temporary diversions of water from the stream, even though the 
said water may be later returned to said stream; (eighth), that 
T oseoh Comer owns as a ,g-rantee of Lot No. 2 in the division of the 
Martin Hite property an undivided one-eighth part of the reserved 
right of the use of water that will flow through a two and one-half 
inch tube, and also the right to water stock in the stream flowing 
from the said spring at the point where the ten foot lane as estab-
lished in the Hite division intersects said stream, which point is on 
the northeast side of the Mill lot; (Ninth), that Joseph M. Hite· as 
the· owner of Lot No. · 1, in the hite division i~ the owner of the 
right to use one-eighth part of the water that will flow .through a 
two and one-half inch tube; (tenth), that Mary E. Hite as the 
present owner of Lot No. 3 in the Hite division owns· all 
page 34 ~ the rest and residue of the right to use the water that 
will flow through-a two and one-half inch tube and the 
44 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
reserved right to use the water in the stream flowing from said 
spring for ordinary dom.estic use as a restricted riparian right ap-
purtenant to her lands that abut said stream flowing from the spring 
or springs aforesaid; (eleventh), that the Town of Luray in order 
to the more perfect enjoyment of said water right has the privilege 
of ·repairing the race leading through the lands now owned by Mary 
E. Hite but is not to change the location of the ·same, said town is 
also to have the right to cut a race from Dry Run to said race on 
the water flowing into the same through the land of the said grantor 
five feet wide and five feet deep but is to construct the embankments 
of the same so as to prevent overflow at any time, and to secure 
the aperture through which the water is to flow from said run into 
said race so that at no time shall the water passing through the same 
exceed two feet in depth and five in width. 
On consideration whereof, it appearing to the Court that Anna 
Broy Martin, Bernice H. Broy, Charles E. Broy, Harriet S. Broy, 
Annie L. Taylor, the heirs of Noah F. Hite, and the heirs of 
George W. Hite, have no right, title or interest in and to the subject 
matter o.f this cause, and are therefore not necessary parties hereto, 
doth accordingly so adjudge, order and decree, and further that the 
said named parties be dismissed as parties defendant herein, without 
cost to them. 
It appearig to the Court that the objects for which this cause was 
instituted have been fully accomplished, it is adjudged, ordered and 
decreed that the same be stricken from the docket and the papers 
thereof be placed among the chancery causes ended. 
Th¢ defendants, ~ary E. · Hite, Joseph M. Hite and Joseph 
Comer, by counsel, objected to the entry of the foregoing decree and 
hereby except to the entry thereof. 
page 35 ~ VIRGINIA, 
PAGE COUNTY, To-Wit: 
I, Grover C. Miller, Clerk of the Circuit Court of ~age County, 
certify that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the 
case of the Town o·f Luray vs. Barbara E. Hite; et als., ( so far as I 
was required to copy), together with a complete index to said 
record hereto attached, and that the notice required by statute was 
given to Ford & Keyser, that this record· was being made. 
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2 In testimony, whereof, I hereto set my hand this 27th day of 
July in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Thirty-nine. 
GROVER C. MILLER, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Page County, Va. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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